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I

JAMES WILSON'S "ASSIMILATION OF THE
COMMON-LAW MIND"
Stephen A. Conrad*
I.

INTRODUCTION:

WILSON IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT

NEO-WHIG REVIVAL

In this essay I turn to James Wilson-again. In fact, periodic return
to this neglected Founder has long been one of the minor revisionist motifs in the constitutional historiography of the early republic. Yet thus
far even the accumulated greater and lesser attempts at rehabilitating
him have not amounted to quite enough to do the job.1 Nor do I pretend
* Associate Professor, School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A., Haverford College, 1973; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1980; J.D., Yale University, 1982.
Earlier versions of parts of this essay were presented at annual meetings of the Social Science
History Association (St. Louis, October 1986) and the Law and Society Association (Washington,
D.C., June 1987). Portions have also been presented at the Legal History Workshop of the Boston
University School of Law, the History Faculty Seminar of Indiana University-Bloomington, and
the East-West Seminar of the International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (Berlin, September 1989). The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Humanities
Center; the J.N. Pew, Jr., Charitable Trust; the National Endowment for the Humanities; and Indiana University. For helpful comments and other assistance, he thanks Bruce Ackerman, Kip Ballantine, Michael Bryant, Michael Grossberg, Philip Hamburger, Hendrik Hartog, Rob Jevon, John
Patterson, Kathryn Preyer, Andrzej Rapaczynski, David Seipp, Bernard Sheehan, Aviam Soifer,
and Jeff and Janet Stake.
1 Among the major twentieth-century efforts are those by Randolph G. Adams, Charles Page
Smith, and Robert Green McCloskey. Adams' contributions include: J. WILSON, SELECTED POLITICAL ESSAYS OF JAMES WILSON (R. Adams ed. 1930); Adams, The Legal Theories ofJames Wilson,
68 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 337 (1920) reprinted in R. ADAMS, POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 134 (1922) [hereinafter Adams, Legal Theories]. Smith's is the only fulllength biography of Wilson. See C.P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798
(1956). Before his untimely death, McCloskey gave us two invaluable essays on Wilson. See J.
WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) [hereinafter WORKS]; McCIoskey, James Wilson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 79-96 (1969); see also G. SEED, JAMES WILSON (1978).
Of lesser scope than the above cited works are Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination in James
Wilson's Theory of Federal Union, 13 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1988) [hereinafter Conrad, Metaphor
and Imagination]; Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's
Republican Theory, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 359 (1985) [hereinafter Conrad, Polite Foundation];Dennison, The "Revolution Principle": Ideology and Constitutionalismin the Thought ofJames Wilson, 39
REV. POLITICS 157 (1977); Leavelle, James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to
American Political Thought, 57 POL. SCi. Q. 394 (1942); Rossum, James Wilson and the Pyramid of
Government, 6 POL. ScI. REVIEWER 113 (Fall 1976); Wills, James Wilson's New Meaningfor Sovereignty, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 99-106 (1988).
Among the significant unpublished work on Wilson, several dissertations have proved especially
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to get the job done here. But the present juncture does seem to me auspicious for an attempt at a better understanding of at least one feature of
Wilson's constitutional thought that has been
a factor in his consignment
2
to the margins of our usable national past.
The feature in question is Wilson's high regard-to judge from his
own professions, his highest regard-for "the common law." Wilson
held the common law not only over and above statutory law, but also
perhaps-and Wilson's apparent ambiguity is at the heart of the matter-over and above what we now call constitutionallaw.
There is some irony in this historical circumstance as thus (so
anachronistically) formulated: that Wilson, one of the principal founders
of our distinctly American constitutional jurisprudence, 3 would (even as
he sat on the first Supreme Court) reserve his warmest regard not for the
"supreme Law of the Land," but for the proverbially antique, AngloSaxon "common law."' 4 Granted, the irony, when couched in this way, is
rather superficial-as historians have generally recognized. Still, the paradoxical character of Wilson (not to mention many another patriotic
Founder) as an ardent common-law ideologue has never been altogether
easy to explain. It may be somewhat easier now, I believe, because several leading historians of eighteenth-century Anglo-American constitutionalism have recently published important works that refine and
supplement earlier scholarship so as to afford a newly enriched historiographical context for reconsidering the strain of "common-law" constitutionalism in the American Founding and its immediate aftermath.
Among the recent works in this neo-whig revival, those of J.G.A.
Pocock, Stanley N. Katz, Jack P. Greene, and John Phillip Reid loom
largest for my purposes-in no small part because these historians, as
they all acknowledge, amplify and consolidate both their own earlier
contributions and those of others.
valuable for the purposes of my own research. See 3. Nedelsky, Property and the Framers of the
United States Constitution: A Study of the Political Thought of James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, and James Wilson (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago); R. Rossum, The Popular Pyramid and the Federal Republic: The Political Thought of James Wilson (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Univ. of Chicago); C.P. Smith, James Wilson, 1787-1798 (1950) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). Also deserving mention is an appreciative and documentary MS work that extends to six
volumes: B. Konkle, The Life and Times of James Wilson (Friends Historical Library of
Swarthmore College).
Furthermore, it has been announced that Professor Garry Wills is at work on a book devoted to
Wilson.
2 See Conrad, Polite Foundation,supra note 1, at 386 & n.73. As I trust I make clear in the
present essay, I could not have written it in 1984, my pretensions in that earlier footnote
notwithstanding.
3 For a recent and representative example of scholarship that tends to reinforce this hardly
unorthodox claim, see Goldstein, PopularSovereignty, the OriginsofJudicialReview, and the Revival
of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POLrICS 51, 59-71 (Feb. 1986).
4 See E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

24 (1928).
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Nevertheless, as the quoted phrase in the title of this essay is intended to indicate, in my reconsideration here of what Wilson said about
the common law, the work of Professor Pocock serves as the uniquely
central point of reference. It was over thirty years ago that Pocock first
introduced a term of historiographical art that has proved to be an invaluable, albeit controversial, rubric: "the common-law mind." In his 1957
book The Ancient Constitution and the FeudalLaw, he coined that term
and began to give it meaning as an analytical category that admits of
both historical variations and the integrity of a long-term tradition. In
1957 Pocock's focus was largely on the legal, historical, and political
thought of seventeenth-century England. But in a substantial 1986 "retrospective" essay on the book, and in other recent essays, Pocock has
given increased attention to some of the latter-day, eighteenth-century
moments in what he has continued to see as an identifiable common-law
mentality. 5 In his view, although the "common-law mind" originated in
seventeenth-century England, it spanned at least two hundred years
thereafter-and at times became as important in some of England's "cul7
tural provinces ' 6 as it was at home.
Whether or not the early 1790s was one of those times is a broad
question I do not mean to address. But to the extent that James Wilson
was a representative or otherwise significant public figure in America
during those years, then this question might be worth pursuing further
than it has been pursued thus far. In any event, in light of Pocock's work
and that of a number of other historians, most notably those I have
named above, it would now be hard to argue that even the most basic
general account of James Wilson's constitutional thought could do justice to the subject without coming to terms with Wilson's approach to
"assimilating the common-law mind" into the constitutionalism of the
8
New Republic.
II.

THE IDEALIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE
AUTHORITY OF CUSTOM: FROM IDEAL TYPE TO THE
ECONOMICS OF ASSIMILATION

While serving as a Justice of the first United States Supreme Court
5 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY-A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT
381 (1987) [hereinafter J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION]; see also J.G.A. POCOCK,
VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 230-310 (1985) [hereinafter J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE,
AND HISTORY].

6 1 take both the term-and the notion of the important category it has been used to denotefrom John Clive and Bernard Bailyn. See Clive & Bailyn, England's CulturalProvinces: Scotland

and America, 11 WM. & MARY

Q. 200 (1954).

7 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 355.
8 The best treatment of Wilson's legal theory in this respect, as in so many other respects, is by
McCloskey. See McCloskey, Introduction, in I WORKS, supra note 1, at 39-40.
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in the early 1790s, Wilson also served as the first Professor of Law at
what is now the University of Pennsylvania. In that academic capacity
he composed, though never completed or fully revised, an extensive series of Lectures on Law. By the standards of today, however, these lectures hardly answer to that general title; they are devoted much more to
patristic constitutional commentary and abstract legal theory than to applied doctrine.
Like the first edition of the Lectures by Wilson's own son, the modem edition by Robert McCloskey contains a lecture entitled (either by
the elder Wilson or by his son) "Of the Common Law." While it is primarily this lecture on which I want to draw here, I hasten to add that the
entire series of lectures includes so much revealing discussion of "the
Common Law"-almost always referred to more in the way of an integral, reified entity than as an aggregate of doctrines-that this single lecture, ostensible set piece though it is, fails to convey some of the most
important things Wilson had to say about the topic to which the title of
the lecture lays claim.
Most important perhaps, this lecture, when taken alone, falls short
of capturing the articulate affect that suffused Wilson's attitude towards
"the Common Law," writ large. As Wilson himself remarked in a preceding lecture (and as McCloskey underscores), when he contemplated
"the Common Law" as "a system of law," Wilson was inclined to speak
nothing short of "poetically." With language that anticipated Keats
himself, he praised the Common Law as not only "just" but "beautiful";
indeed, "to every age," he said, "it has disclosed new beauties and new
truths." 9
Most historians of eighteenth-century America are unlikely to find it
especially remarkable to encounter a testimonial to the common law
from an erudite American lawyer writing in the 1790s. As the historian
Stanley N. Katz reminds us in a recent essay, it has often been noted
that, even during the climacteric of the Revolutionary break from England, Americans, in creating their Republic, remained very muchalthough far from exclusively-under the influence of their longstanding
"eighteenth-century romance with the common law."' 10 Moreover, after
independence had been won, the "Cokeian" tradition of English constitutionalism,1 1 predicated on a defense of "rights" inhering in or derived
from the common law, became a sufficiently important "original" ele9 1 Works, supra note 1, at 182-83; see also id. at 40 n.122 (McCloskey's Introduction). Cf.
Stein, Common Law, in 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 691, 694 (P. Wiener ed. 1973)
(on "the emotive force" that the common law came to acquire in England); id. at 696 ("As a body of
law the common law has inspired an intensely emotional loyalty in its adherents.").
10 Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23, 35 (1987).
11 For a convenient account of this tradition in its formative period, see H. NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW: LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ENGLAND,

xx, passim (1977).

1660-1689, at ix-
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ment of "the American constitutional tradition" that "without it we can
hardly begin to understand the basic theme in the development of American political institutions over the past two hundred years."' 2
Yet even if one accepts (as I do) Katz's synthesizing approach,
which acknowledges a place for the common-law tradition in the origins
of American constitutionalism but does not by any means try to reduce
those origins to that source, 13 one is, I believe, still left without a satisfactory explanation for the headiness of Wilson's distinctive rapture over
"the Common Law."
To Wilson, even after the American war against parliamentary sovereignty had been won-thus, in the eyes of many Americans, vindicating their devotion to "the true principles" of authentic, that is,
seventeenth-century, English constitutionalism' 4 -it remained equally
important to appreciate the surpassing excellence of the common law as
it had come to expound the principles of the popular republicanism that
was the most novel contribution of the Revolutionary generations to
modem constitutional theory. 15 In Wilson's words, even though the national Constitution and the several state constitutions "compose the
supreme law of the land .

.

. [, in that] they contain and they suggest

many of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence, and must have a
governing and an extensive influence over almost every other part of our
legal system,"' 16 nevertheless, in the new American nation and its several
states the common law remained not merely the "graviorlex," in respect
to statutes, 17 but also the only "species" of law that took its very identity
from the "most significant" and "most effectual.., mode for the promulgation of human laws"-namely "custom.""' It was, then, the character
of the common law as customary law that moved Wilson to the language
12 Katz, supra note 10, at 31, 35.
13 Katz points out that not even Charles Howard Mcllwain-the doyen of the modern neo-whig

"constitutionalist" school-subscribed to such reductionism. Id. at 30-31; see C. MCILWAIN, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1923); see also B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 (1967); F. MCDONALD, Novus
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 144 (1985). But see J.
REID, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS 188 (1986) [hereinafter J. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS]; J. REID, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 265, 268 (1987) [hereinafter
J. REID, AUTHORITY TO TAX].
14 Cf. J. MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 17741776, at 19 (1987) (quoting Wilson: "They know little of the English Constitution who are ignorant
[of] the Lawfulness of Resistance on the Part of those who govern."). But see H. NENNER, supra
note 11, at xiv.
15 For an appreciation of the distinctiveness of the constitutionalist legacy of the American
Revolution-by one of the leading European students of early American history, see Stourzh, The

American Revolution, Modern Constitutionalism, and the Protection of Human Rights, in TRUTH
AND TRAGEDY: A TRIBUTE TO HANS J. MORGENTHAU 162 (1984).
16 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 61.

17 Id. at 356; see also id. at 60-61.
18 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).

84:186 (1989)

Wilson's Common-Law Mind

of superlatives. It would seem to follow that it is this defining characteristic-this "mode of promulgation"-of the common law that should be
the point of departure in trying to understand Wilson's enthusiasm. But,
once again, to say this much does not go very far towards explaining
what, if anything, was distinctive about Wilson's common-law ideology.
On the contrary, the notion that the common law owes its incomparable virtues to its basis in "custom" was surely the most important common denominator (if there was one) in the approaches to legal and
constitutional theory that predominated in eighteenth-century England
and began to proliferate in the New Republic. And if this sweeping generalization as applied to America was ever open to challenge, it seems
much less so now, on account of the wealth of evidence assembled in
recent work by Jack P. Greene and John Phillip Reid. This work is most
fully represented in Greene's Peripheriesand Center,19 a synoptic study
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century American constitutional thought,
and in Reid's ConstitutionalHistory of the American Revolution,20 a trilogy in progress that has concentrated thus far on the 1760s and 1770s.
When considered together and of a piece, both Greene's and Reid's analyses can, however, be traced back to Professor Pocock's work, at least
insofar as all three of these neo-McIlwainians2 1 treat what might be
called, in the most general terms, the Anglo-American "constitutional22
ism of the common-law mind."
More than anything else, it is Pocock's hypostasis of a historically
specific but variable and enduring "common-law mind" that has elicited
charges tantamount to "closet McIlwainianism" against him, because of
the primacy he has at times appeared to ascribe to "law" in his own
treatments of politics and political culture. 23 And what is most interesting for my purposes, and for those of Greene and Reid as well, is that
Pocock's method of hypostasis proceeds from his positing an "ideal
type"' 24 of the "common-law mind" with reference to which the "idealization of custom" ' 25 can then be considered as the integrating theme of
the common-law tradition over time. This approach, whatever its full
19

J.P.

GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE

EX-

TENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788 (1986) [hereinafter J.P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER].
20 J.REID,AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 13; J. REID, AUTHORITY TO TAx, supranote 13.

A third volume, The Authority to Legislate, is forthcoming. See Greene, "The Ostensible Cause Was
... the True Cause": The Salience ofRights in the Origins ofthe American Revolution, 16 REv. AM.
HIST. 198 (1988) (Greene's review of Reid's AUTHORITY OF RGHTs).
21 On Charles W. Mclwain and his legacy, see Katz, supra note 10.
22 See Conrad, The Constitutionalismof "the Common-law Mind" 13 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 619
(1988) (review essay on Reid and Greene); cf.Conrad, Book Review, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 775
(1988) (review of Reid's first two volumes on the constitutional history of the American Revolution).
23 See J.G.A. POCOCK,THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 265, 276.
24 Id. at 263.
25 Id. at 15, passim.
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array of strengths and weaknesses, has done more than any other to
highlight the intrinsic ambiguities in the constitutional thought of all the
revered seventeenth-century paragons of the common-law tradition.
As his "ideal type" of the "common-law mind," however, Pocock
has selected not the illustrious Coke, or even Hale or Prynne, but Sir
John Davies,2 6 a figure somewhat earlier and less familiar than those
Whig notables, but as a common-law theorist even more fitting than they
as an epitome of the problematic ambiguities at issue. For, as Pocock
presents him, Davies personifies both the inherent cultural relativism of
the common-law mind and its logically contradictory pretension to absolute, universal superiority. Furthermore, as Pocock has emphasized in
his own most recent reconsideration of key passages from Davies' pen
(and Coke's, too), this ambiguity of the common-law mind, as between
relativistic and universalistic claims of authority, extended not only to
the dimension of geographical space- that is, the self-deluding "insularity" of the seventeenth-century common-law mind in its claims about the
source(s) of English law. 27 This ambiguity in the common-law mind also
extended to the dimension of historical time itself, above all, in a paradoxical insistence that the basis of the common law in consuetudines has
always rendered it at once constantly adapting yet essentially unchang28
ing, indeed, timeless.
The belief in the paradoxical timelessness of the common law as a
nonetheless adaptive institution was compassed most ingeniously in the
classical seventeenth-century axiom that the common law was "immemorial." While the paradox was open to at least partial resolution by
"saying that it was less . .. the content of the law than the juridical
process itself . . . that was immemorial, ' 29 still, in eighteenth-century

26 Davies was an early seventeenth-century attorney general of Ireland (and also a poet of some
note). His principal legacy to the common-law tradition has proved to be his Irish Reports. On
Davies generally, see Davies, Sir John (1569-1626), 14 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 140
(L. Stephen ed. 1888). See also J.P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER, supranote 19, at 38-39; J.
REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 34.

27 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 41; But see id. at 59, 263-64
(where Pocock qualifies his point about Davies' insularity even as he reiterates it). On this theme in
Blackstone, see Cairns, Blackstone, the Ancient Constitution andthe FeudalLaw 28 HIT. J. 711, 717
(1985). But for a complementary perspective, see Cairns, Blackstone, an English Institutist: Legal
Literatureand the Rise of the Nation State, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 318, 359-60 (1984) (citing
Professor A.W.B. Simpson in accord with this view of Blackstone as a European "institutional
writer").
28 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION,supra note 5, at 32-34, 36, 41, 263-264; see
also id. at 274 (on the tradition similarly but more broadly); id. at 170, 178, 339 (on the intrinsic
ambiguities in Coke's thought). Pocock carefully avoids making any claims as to Davies' typicality
or direct influence. On some of the difficulties of making such claims-and for a rather different
view of Davies' significance as a general theorist of English law--see M. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF
THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND,

1603-1645, at 134-35 (reprint ed. 1988).
29 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 275; cf. id. at 34041.
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England there did eventually emerge within the common-law tradition
itself a manifest disinclination to continue to take "literally" the earlier
synchronistic assertion that both the common law and the "constitution"
'30
it had generated had existed from "time out of mind."
In remarking on this eighteenth-century reorientation of the common-law tradition away from the "myth" of immemoriality, Professor
Pocock has, however, recently added that "in the latter part of the eighteenth century [in England], we encounter what is unmistakably a recrudescence of the prescriptive and immemorial character of the law and the

constitution. ' 31 Although he has thus far elaborated his general point
chiefly as it applies to Burke, 32 Pocock has also mentioned Blackstone

and Bentham in this connection, because of the undeniable (although as
yet too little explored) "ideological significance" of The Commentaries
and the reaction they provoked from their first and greatest utilitarian
33
critic.
What Professor Pocock merely hints about Blackstone and Bentham
is nevertheless a very suggestive complement to what he argues in detail
about Burke. Looking back on Blackstone's achievement and Bentham's
challenge to it in light of Pocock's argument that "Burke knew and assimilated 'the common-law mind' in a way which sets him apart from

[other "intelligent conservatives" of the era like] Hume and [Josiah]
Tucker" might prompt many fruitful analogies. For example, it might
prove enlightening to explore precisely how Blackstone knew and assimilated "the common-law mind" in a way that distinguishes his achievement as an "intelligent conservative" not only from Burke's but also
30 Id. at 233. On Blackstone, see a recent article to which I am greatly indebted: Lieberman,
Blackstone's Science of Legislation, 27 J. BRIT. STUD. 117 (1988); cf. 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 184185, 342.
31 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 379.
32 Id.; see also id. at 380-84. Also of interest are three earlier essays by Pocock: Pocock, The
PoliticalEconomy of Burke's Analysis of the French Revolution, 25 HIST. J. 331 (1982) reprinted in
J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 193; Pocock, Burke and the
Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas, 3 HIST. J. 125 (1960) reprintedin J.G.A.
POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202

(1971); Pocock, Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke, and Price: A Study in the Varieties of Eighteenth
Century Conservatism,reprintedin J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note
5, at 157. See also J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 279-3 10;
Conrad, Book Review, 5 L. & HIST. REv. 286 (1987) (my own review of VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND
HISTORY).

33 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 379. But on the ideological
aspects of Bentham's critique of Blackstone, see Lieberman, supra note 30; see also D. LIEBERMAN,
THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
BRITAIN (1989). I am indebted to Lieberman's article not least in those respects in which it acknowledges Lieberman's own debt to the earlier work of A.W.B. Simpson and Gerald J. Postema.
See G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986); Simpson, The Common
Law andLegal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as reprinted in A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359 (1987)].
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from that of another noted eighteenth-century exponent of customary
constitutionalism, Thomas Rutherforth, who was the leading eighteenthcentury English exponent of "natural law" theory, and whose ideas
34
proved accessible and appealing to American and English whigs alike.
Indeed, the strategic use that Professors Greene and Reid have lately
made of both Burke and Rutherforth in reinterpreting the story of the
early development of American constitutionalsm 35 adds fresh historical
interest to the prospect of exploring, via analogy to Pocock's suggestive
insight, this and any number of individual distinctions within the motley
eighteenth-century canon of whig constitutionalists.
My own immediate focus on Wilson, in light of the recent neo-whig
revival, therefore raises the question, in Pocock's terms, how Wilson-as
a distinctly American whig-might be understood to have "known and
assimilated" the English " 'common-law' mind" into republican constitutional theory in a way that "sets him apart" from, say, Madison and
Hamilton, or, for that matter, many another leading apologist for the
"Federalist persuasion." Indeed, this question, although to my knowl36
edge not addressed at any length in the studies we have of Wilson,
would seem unavoidable. It is well-settled that Wilson was widely regarded by his illustrious American contemporaries as the outstanding
legal scholar in the new nation. 37 More to the point, however, and more
a matter of fact than reputation, Wilson, with his Law Lectures, became
the only leading framer 38 to leave behind an extensive patristic contribution to early American legal theory. 39 Wilson's unique place as both a
leading framer and one of the foremost American jurisprudents of his
generation should lead us to ask whether and, if so, how Wilson went
about appropriating the common-law tradition to American legal theory.
34 See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, supra note 33, at 260, 298-99 (referring to the accessibility and
appeal of Rutherforth in eighteenth-century America in two different essays, The Horwitz Thesis and
the History of Contractsand The Rise and Fall ofthe Legal Treatise). But, for a differing view about
the Independence movement, if not also about the subsequent Founding period, see F. McDONALD,
supra note 13, at 60.
35 See, e.g., J.P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER, supra note 19, at 64-66, passim (on
Burke); id. at 38-39, passim (on Rutherforth); J. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 83, passim (1988) (on Burke); id. at 30, 42 (on Rutherforth).
36 But see 1 WORKS, supra note I, at 39-40; Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629 (1933) reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN

LAW (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
37 See, eg., R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 6 (1948); see also Adams,
Legal Theories, supra note 1, at 338.
38 On Hamilton's negligible role as a framer, see C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 165, 252-53 (1966). Thus, strictly speaking, I need not face the important question of the
significance of Hamilton's contributions to legal theory.
39 See, e-g., B. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 281 (1931) (Wilson's law lectures "give us the best statement we have of the considered legal theories of one of the founders of American constitutional
law"); see also I W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 564 (1953).
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As I have tried to make clear already, the initial question is an-

swered in Wilson's law lectures in no uncertain terms. Like eighteenthcentury America at large, Wilson embraced the common-law tradition;
his claim to distinction seems to lie only in that he forcefully expressed,
and at a formative moment, what many other Americans felt and some
had said. But an examination of Wilson's elaborately articulate common-law ideology discloses more. In expounding it, he evidently aspired

to nothing less than a fundamental reconception of "the Common Law,"

in which he would try to "reconcile" the latent "contradictions,"' 4 not to
mention the manifest ambiguities, 4 1 of "the rule of law" in a new republic
whose still predominating legal tradition was not predominantly

republican.
This ambitious project of "reconciling" the ostensibly English common-law tradition with the principles of Revolutionary American republicanism was just what Wilson had in mind in offering what he candidly
termed a "political doctrine" 42 of the common law. And it is not the
least measure of Wilson's perceived success in this endeavor that modem
commentators as different as an insider like jurist and American Bar Association President Simeon E. Baldwin 4 3 and an outsider like maverick
legal philosopher Morris Cohen44 have each recognized Wilson's contributions. Baldwin referred to Wilson as "the real founder of what is distinctive in our American jurisprudence";4 5 Cohen wrote that Wilson was
40 See 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 185: see also Conrad,Metaphor andImagination,supra note 1,
at 39, passim; Conrad, PoliteFoundation,supra note 1, at 368, passim; Farr, Conceptual Change and
ConstitutionalInnovation, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 13.
Americans could change their language just as they could change their government and its
instrument. Thus "contradictions" both charged the rhetorical atmosphere of debate and informed the quieter chambers of reflection. And they motivated changes in belief and in practice
and in the concepts that made these beliefs and practices possible.
Id. at 29; cf.Nedelsky, ConfiningDemocratic Politics: Anti-Federalists,Federalists,and the Constitution, 96 HARV. L. REv. 350 (1982) (quoting with approval Herbert Storing on the Anti-Federalists'
unrealistic attempts "to reconcile contradictions").
41 On what Gordon Wood calls "The Ambiguity of American Law," see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 291 (1969).

It began to seem to some that Americans could not have specific legislative enactment and
equity at the same time, or, contrary to the Beccarian belief, that codification and simplification
of the law demanded an increase, not a lessening, of judicial interpretation and discretion....
At the heart of the problem lay Americans' ambivalent attitude toward law in confrontation with the new circumstances of the 1780's.... Morality was the basis of a republic.
What was needed in fact was a revolutionary clarification in the Americans' underW
standing of law and politics.
Id. at 303, 305.
42 1 WORKS, supranote 1, at 184; cf.id. at 183 ("customary law.., part of the political family").
43 See Horwitz, Introduction to C. GOETSCH, ESSAYS ON SIMEON E. BALDWIN, at xxiii, xxiv
(1980).
44 See Rosenfield, Introduction to M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, at xiii-xxxv (1982).

45 See Alexander, James Wilson, Patriot,and the Wilson Doctrine, 183 N. AM. REv. 971, 980
(1906) (quoting Simeon E. Baldwin).
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the first in time of the five American legal theorists (the others being
Marshall, Kent, Story, and John Bannister Gibson) "who may be said to
'46
have laid the foundations of the American common law."
But, at least to the historian, more interesting than Wilson's putative
"success" in devising a faithfully republican appropriation, or assimilation, of "the common-law mind" is the way he went about it. For, not
entirely unlike Burke, at least as Pocock has recently interpreted him, 47
Wilson tried in the 1790s to redeem the common-law tradition by
"remov[ing]" it almost entirely from "the key of jurisprudence" and
transposing it to that of "culture" 4 8 -in Wilson's case the civic culture of
the newly imagined ideals of popular republicanism.
At the Founding the ingrained habits of "the common-law mind"
and the cherished institutionalization of the common-law tradition in
America continued, of course, to pose the task of "Americanizing the
common law," as Professor Nelson has explained in his meticulous study
of this process in Massachusetts from 1760 to 1830.4 9 But the Americanization of the common law, at least at the level of common-law constitutionalism and general legal theory that preoccupied Wilson, also required
a fundamental reconception of "the Common Law" that would greatly
change the meaning of that term while seeming to do so as little as possible. Given that the ideal-or delusion--of reconciling, indeed, identifying, change within continuity was at the heart of the common-law
tradition itself, Wilson's aim to assimilate the common-law mind into the
"republican manners" of the new American nation may have engaged a
problem that entailed its own solution-and was therefore a problem already in the process of solving itself. Yet even if so, this was not the way
Wilson saw the situation. Rather, to serve republican ends in America,
the authority of common law, he believed, would have to be carefully and
expressly reconceived. And this would have to be done in a way that
would economize on the historic dignity of the common law, but also
seek a iustification for its authority by reaching beyond historical arguments, even to the point of reaching outside the common-law tradition,
46 See M. COHEN, supra note 44, at 333.
47 See Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas,supra note
32.
48 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 381-82; cf.J.G.A. POCOCK,
VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 209-210, 301, passim (discussing Burke).
More than one review has focused on the centrality of this theme in Pocock's work. See, e.g.,
Conrad, Book Review, 5 L. & HIsT. REV. 286 (1987); Goldie, The Rise of Politeness (Book Review),
Times Literary Supplement, June 27, 1986, at 715.
49 W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE

ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). For an especially important and provocative sampie of Professor Nelson's views on the place of what I have called common-law constitutionalism in
early American constitutional theory, see Nelson, The Eighteenth-CenturyBackgroundof John Marshall's ConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MICH. L. REV. 893 (1978).
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at least as it had theretofore been understood.5 0
III.

THE COMMON LAW AS COMMON SENSE: THE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSENT
The analogy between Burke and Wilson that Pocock's hint can be
taken to suggest is especially useful for my immediate purposes sl because
it opens the way to seeing why Wilson displayed such an obsessive antipathy to the proclaimed common-law constitutionalism of Blackstone.
Among the Founders, antipathy towards Blackstone was not unique to
Wilson. Jefferson, for one, came to share it, and indeed to feel it so
strongly that it was not until another Virginia lawyer, St. George Tucker,
produced a "republicanized" version of the Commentaries in the early
nineteenth century that Jefferson thought they made safe reading for
Americans.5 2 Nevertheless, in point of time and degree of vehemence,
Wilson took the lead in warning against the danger of Americans' widespread acceptance of what he thought to be Blackstone's superficially
appealing yet ultimately corrupt restatement of common-law
53
constitutionalism.
'5 4
The danger, as Wilson saw it, lay in the subtly "antirepublican,
indeed, "despotick," 5 5 implications of what Blackstone said-and even
more in what Blackstone did not say. In other words, the danger to
susceptible Americans, devoted as they were to the authentic commonlaw tradition, was that Blackstone himself was 5at6 best a diffident, and at
worst a duplicitous, exponent of that tradition.
In fairness to Blackstone, however, it should be repeated that the
danger Wilson perceived in Blackstone's version of common-law constitutionalism was to some extent inherent in the intrinsic indeterminacy of
the common-law tradition itself. As Pocock emphasizes, the tradition
was chronically "liable to assimilation" into the hoary ideal of the balanced constitution, especially as the tradition was embodied in the myth
of an "ancient constitution" predicated on customary authority that had
existed "time out of mind."'57 This ideal (whether in Aristotle's original
50 For an analogous point about Wilson's reconception of "natural law theory," see Cohen, The
American Revolution and NaturalLaw Theory, 39 J. HIsT. IDEAS 491, 497-98 (1978).
51 Cf Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination, supra note 1,at 53 & n.225.
52 Waterman, supranote 36, at 460-61, 480-81. For Waterman's discussion of Wilson's views on
Blackstone, see id. at 475-80.
53 See F. MCDONALD, supra note 13, at 37 n.35 ("Americans could derive their English constitutional history from a variety of sources, but the most common were two: Hume's History of England and Blackstone's Commentaries ....Blackstone's version was the more generally accepted in
America."); see also Waterman, supra note 36, at 452-53.
54 1 WORKS, supra note 1,at 79.
55 Id. at 104, passim.
56 On the important point that it was Blackstone's intention to address the lay audience at large,
see Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, I OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981).
57 J.G.A. POCOCK,THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 365.
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formulation, or in a reformulation by Polybius, James Harrington, John
DeLolme, or Edmund Burke) by definition made a place in the constitutional order for monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements alike.
Moreover, because of the susceptibility of the tradition itself to this ideal
of balanced constitutionalism, the danger that the American attachment
to the common-law tradition might lead to a subversion of popular republicanism was not precluded by the otherwise reassuring circumstance
that an American consensus had formed against the establishment of distinct orders either in government or in society. At the Philadelphia Convention the framers generally agreed that the "manners" of the
American people were thoroughly and immovably "republican. '58 Nevertheless, as the Anti-Federalists so often warned during the ratification
debates, this did not mean that the threat of the development of aristocratic tendencies in American government was thereby obviated.5 9 Indeed, to quote Professor Pocock yet again, "a republic is ex hypthesi a
relationship between an aristocracy and a democracy. ... [In a true republic t]he practical necessity is therefore the reconstitution of aristocracy in some other form, to play its part .... -60
This, I submit, is what Wilson aimed at: to reconceive what the
common law, as an institution, meant, in order to incorporate into American constitutionalism something of the proverbial political virtues of aristocracy-namely, wisdom and knowledge 6 l-but in a way that would
both seem and prove compatible with the fortunes of thoroughly popular
republicanism. Furthermore, by the time he composed his law lectures,
Wilson had arrived at an approach for accomplishing this reconception.
In sum, Wilson argued that the common-law tradition must be reconciled in America with what stood indisputably as the one and only
legitimate principle of political obligation, the truth of which had often
58 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66, 153 (M. Farrand rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND].
59 See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 17, 43-44 (H. Storing ed. 1981). On the culture of
monarchicalism in America, see R. BUSHMAN, KING AND PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL MASSACHU-

SETrS (1985).
60 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 328-29. For Pocock's perspective on the "monarchical" American presidency, at the Founding and today, see his essay States,
Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 55, 73-76. For a fascinating study of the Continental Congress as a functional republican analog of the English monarchy, see generally J. MARSTON, supra note 14.
61 Cf. 1 WORKS, supra note 1:
In the natural body, diseases will happen; but a due temperament and a sound constitution will,
by degrees, work out those adventitious and accidental diseases, and will restore the body to its
just state and situation. So is it in the body politick, whose constitution is animated and invigorated by the common law. When, through errours, or distempers, or iniquities of men or times,
the peace of the nation, or the right order of government have received interruption; the common law has wrought out those errours, distempers, and iniquities; and has reinstated the nation in its natural and peaceful state and temperament.
Id. at 355.
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been glimpsed down through the ages, but that the American Revolution
had decisively vindicated for the first time in recorded history. 62 This
was the principle comprehended in the "maxim" that Wilson took to be
"of prime importance in the science of government and human laws-a
'63
free people are governed by laws, of which they approve.
Throughout his law lectures, Wilson endlessly repeated this maxim,
in one variation or another, apparently for the sake of the evocativeness
in which he, as a common lawyer, believed maxims abound: "[C]onsent
is the sole obligatory principle of human government and human
laws." 64 Wilson fully appreciated that much of what this maxim evoked
was a sense of historic authority that nevertheless went beyond the particular authority of any specific person or event that had borne historic
witness to it. In fact, he pointed out, this maxim about the consensual
basis of all legitimate political and legal obligation had been as familiar to
the republican lawyers of ancient Rome as to the barons on Runnymede,
and as self-evidently true to that tasteful libertine the Earl of Shaftesbury
65
as to the artfully pious Elizabethan Richard Hooker.
In his express reverence, then, for what Francis Bacon had taught
common lawyers about the capability of maxims generally in "legal science"-that maxims, by their pointed but elliptical nature, require but
also direct further inquiry 66-and in what Wilson had learned were the
rather indiscriminate, even if heartening, historic testimonials to the
truth of the consent maxim, he saw important implications: he saw that
a maxim alone was not a theory, at least not a theory sufficient to insure
American republicanism against Blackstone's appeal.
For on occasion Blackstone did pay eloquent lip service to the principle of consensual obligation, foremostly in rehearsing the common-law
tenet that "custom" evinces "consent." "It is," Blackstone intoned, "one
of the characteristick marks of English liberty... that our common law
depends upon custom, which carries this internal evidence of freedom
along with it, that it was probably introduced by the voluntary consent of
the people." 67
62 See id. at 79 ("the revolution principle"); cf.2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 362 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]

(the American Revolution as one of the "progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and increasing the happiness of society and mankind").
63 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 179.
64 Id. at 192 (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 123.
66 For example, in De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon says that a legal maxim "points at the law
but does not settle it." F. BACON, DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM 8:85; see also Kocher, Francis
Bacon on the Science ofJurisprudence, 18 J. HIsT. IDEAS 3, 3-12 (1957); Shapiro, Law and Science in
Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 736-37 (1969).
67 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 185 (Sir William Blackstone as quoted by Wilson); cf.W. BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND-A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF
1765-1769, at 74 (1979).
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Yet Wilson was far from satisfied that such passages in the Commentaries sufficed, either in themselves or in context, to render Blackstone the trustworthy modem spokesman he was widely taken to be for a
"political doctrine" of the common law appropriate to a republic. 6 8 In
Wilson's judgment, what might seem to be Blackstone's restatement of
the authentic common-law tradition turned out to be, in effect, a covert
but thoroughgoing repudiation of that tradition. In the true, historic
"publick" and "private" law of England, said Wilson,
[W]e shall find the stream of authority running, from the most early periods, uniform and strong in the direction of the principle of consent--consent, given originally-consent, given in the form of ratification-and, what
is most satisfactory of all, consent given after long, approved, and uninterrupted experience. This last, I think, is the principle of the common law. It
is the most salutary principle of obedience to human laws, that ever was
diffused among men. With such a Byzantium before him, is it not astonishing, indeed, that the attention-must I say the attachment?-of
Sir William
69
Blackstone should be attracted towards a Chalcedon?
Chalcedon here stands both for Blackstone's positivist, hence to Wlson "despotick," definition of "law in general" as a rule or command
dispensed from superior to inferior, 70 and for Blackstone's salient endorsement of the eighteenth-century English constitutional doctrine of
the supremacy, both political and legal, of the legislature, that is, Parliament. 7 1 It was in the name of "the Common Law" that Wilson emphatically rejected this definition and this doctrine for America (and for any
68 But see Stourzh, William Blackstone: Teacher of Revolution, 15 JAHRBUCH FUR AMERIKASTUDIEN 184 (1970):
Blackstone's conservatism and his championship of parliamentary sovereignty should not obscure the fact that not only radical Whigs like Trenchard and Gordon or James Burgh stood on
"revolution principles," but Blackstone as well. He had a Whig message to convey, and it was
taken up by a number of prominent colonists in their fight against the mother country.
Id. at 184 (English abstract).
69 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 180. Wilson's classical allusion is apparently to pages from Tacitus
and Gibbon. For example, from Tacitus:
For the city of Byzantium is situated at the extreme edge of Europe, at the narrowest part of the
straits which separates it from Asia. When its Greek founders enquired of the Pythian Apollo
where they should build their city, the oracle told them to look for a site opposite Blind-man's
Land: a riddle which pointed to the people of Chalcedon, who having arrived there first, and
having the better situation before their eyes, chose the worse.
2 The Annals of Tacitus 110 (G. Ramsay trans. 1909).
70 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 103-09, passim.
71 Id. at 180, passim. For background on the "rise" of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy
as a matter of constitutional and legal sovereignty, various contributions from many of the historians
cited in this essay are helpful. See, e.g., Pocock, 1776 The Revolution Against Parliament, in
THREE BRrrISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 265 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1980). For further
background, see Dickinson, The Eighteenth-CenturyDebate on the Sovereignty of Parliament, 26
ROYAL HIsT. Soc'Y, TRANSACTIONS 189 (1976). But perhaps the most sophisticated and elucidating work on the topic "from the perspective of law" is Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case
for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976); cf Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context
and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. ATLANTIC Q. 57, 64 (1986).
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"free" regime). 72 He also added that both the definition and the doctrine
73
were "not calculated [even] for the meridian of Great Britain" herself.
For Blackstone to embrace the common-law tradition on one page only
to subscribe wholesale on the next to the very antithesis of that tradition-namely, in what Wilson viewed as Blackstone's positivist constitutionalism predicated on the principle of "parliamentary sovereignty"was for Blackstone to contradict himself irredeemably and to betray the
cause of constitutional liberty all but outright. 74
Thus provoked by what he saw as Blackstone's subversion of the
principle of consensual obligation and by Blackstone's degradation of the
common law from its rightful primacy, Wilson reasserted an indisputable
pre-eminence for the common law, both as private law and as the model
for "publick law." Furthermore, he insisted that its pre-eminence had
remained continuously intact, at law even if not in politics, both in
75
America and England, notwithstanding Blackstone to the contrary.
This "uninterrupted" pre-eminence at law was, for Wilson, a historical
fact; but much more important, it was a datum exemplifying an essential
principle that transcended any of the accidental eventualities of politics
or jurisprudence. This was the essential common-law principle itself, a
principle that Wilson, as I have tried to begin to convey, thought it necessary to couch not in formal but in functionalist terms. It was the principle that:
Of all yet suggested, the mode for the promulgation of human laws by custom seems the most significant, and the most effectual. It involves in it
internal evidence, of the strongest kind, that the law has been introduced by
common consent; and that this consent rests upon the most solid basisexperience as well as opinion. This mode of promulgation points to the
strongest characteristick of liberty, as well as of law. For a consent thus
practically
given, must have been given in the freest and most unbiased
76
manner.
As much as Wilson's words might at first appear to resemble Blackstone's, the differences are (or, at least, were to Wilson) more important
72 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 118, passim.
73 Id. at 185; see also 2 WORKS,supra note 1, at 735 (Wilson's 1774 pamphlet "Considerations
on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament"); Grey, Origins of
the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 843, 887-89 (1978).
74 David Lieberman has collected a number of citations to modem scholarly commentary on this
putative contradiction. Lieberman, supra note 30, at 126 n.40; see also Corwin, The "HigherLaw"
Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 365, 385, 405 (1928); Kennedy, The StructureofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979); Simpson, supra
note 33, at 362. Rather in contrast to Wilson's anxious castigation of Blackstone is the view expressed in Lobban, Blackstone and the Science of Law, 30 Hisr. J. 311, 326 (1987) ("Blackstone
seems to have adopted this notion of parliamentary sovereignty without fully realizing its difficulties
for his natural-law arguments and his belief in the primacy of the common law.").
75 1 WoRKS, supra note 1, at 182, 352.
76 Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
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than the similarities. When considered in the context of Wilson's full
exposition of his enthusiasm for the common law-which was much
more than Blackstone's, the enthusiasm of a true believer in the incomparable excellence and authority of the common law among all the "species" of "human law"-this passage suggests a view different from
Blackstone's about exactly how it is that the common law as customary
law imports consensual obligation.
As Wilson indicated here and explained more fully over the course
of his Law Lectures, for him the crux of the matter lay in the actual
process of the development of the common law, which reconciles "law"
and "liberty" by drawing on both "experience" and "opinion." Despite
Blackstone's acknowledgment that "custom" bears "internal evidence"
of "voluntary consent," Wilson surmised that Blackstone was not at all
concerned with inquiring into the meaning of "custom" beyond its significance as precedent;77 thus, Blackstone had no regard to or for custom as
an institution of socialauthority. Blackstone therefore failed to take seriously the importance of this essential phenomenon of the common lawcustom-in that he never addressed the question of exactly how consent
is realized in custom. Instead, Blackstone simply reduced the common
law to a "historical science,"' 78 to be studied and applied without reference to what Wilson deemed the most fundamental of sciences, the "science of human nature."
Wilson himself said more than once in his lectures that "the most
proper way to teach and to study the common law, is to teach and study
it as an historical science."' 79 Francis Bacon, among others, had said the
same.8 0 And Wilson apparently meant it as much as Bacon had, because
Wilson devoted a great portion of his lecture "Of the Common Law" to a
historical "deduction" 8 1 of the common-law tradition, tracing its origins
from the Greeks and Romans, to the Druids, and through the Saxon,
Norman, and later epochs of the British constitution, down to "the com8' 2
mon law, as now received in America.
77 Cf. Lieberman, supra note 30, at 129-130 (emphasizing Blackstone's concern with judicial
reception as authority for the legal force of customary law); Lobban, supra note 74, at 328 ("It is
significant that Blackstone should argue that precedents must be followed because their reason was
hidden."). For a discussion of "artificial reason" in Coke's legal theory, and for an interpretation
written "[a]gainst ... the populist version of Coke's basic approach," see Gray, Reason, Authority
and Imagination: The JurisprudenceofSir Edward Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 39, passim (P. Zagorin ed. 1980).

78 For examples of recent scholarly attention to Blackstone's appeal to the authority of history,
see Willman, Blackstone and the "Theoretical Perfection" ofEnglish Law in the Reign of CharlesII,
26 HIST. J. 39 (1983), and Cairns, Blackstone, the Ancient Constitution and the FeudalLaw,28 HIT.
J. 711 (1985) (response to Willman).
79 See, e.g., 1 WORKS, supra note I, at 350.
80 Id. at 91.
81 Id. at 349: see also id. at 472.
82 Id. at 348. It is worthy of mention, but hardly surprising, that Wilson relies for much of his
historical deduction on that "bold and industrious antiquarian," id. at 346, the Celtic historian John
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It becomes clear, however, that to Wilson, although historical study
of the common law is "valuable and instructive," such study nevertheless
"illustrates," but ultimately cannot "justify," the authority of the common law-much as Cicero taught that the "philosophical" tales of belles
lettres could at times afford convenient "illustrations" of law.8 3 Indeed,
when read closely, Wilson's extensive "historical deduction" reveals how
little of the history of the common law was truly known at all. The lessons of history are, for the lawyer, of little more than incidental significance. As Wilson casually remarked at the outset of his confessedly
arcane excursion into the ancient pedigree of the common law: "If this
investigation is difficult, there is one consolation, that it is not of essential
'84
importance."
For Wilson, then, the 'justifying"-that is, the empirical authorization-of the common law is to be found not in history, but in "science"
proper, not in the vagaries of the particularized experience of distant and
largely unknowable societies but in the truths of general, or "common,"
experience. These truths are sometimes corroborated by the historical
record, but they can be authenticated sufficiently and necessarily only in
the experience of each individual, as individual experience testifies to
common experience.8 5
No theme waxes more prominent over the course of Wilson's lectures than the one he finds in the Ciceronian precept "Naturajuris a
natura hominis repetenda est."18 6 In the more emphatic version of Wilson's avowedly Baconian 87 polemic against Blackstone--especially as
Wilson took his Baconianism via the scientism of eighteenth-century
Scottish Common Sense philosophy18 -this Ciceronian precept becomes:
"[L]aw can never attain either the extent or elevation of science, unless it
be raised upon the science of man."'8 9 And while Wilson shunned reductive systematization wherever he recognized it and instead relished "the
variety of human nature" (which is not "easily comprehended or
Whitaker. See 2 WORKS, supranote 1, at 856 (citing the edition of Whitaker'sHistoryofManchester
on which Wilson drew so heavily).
83 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 236, 336.
84 Id. at 335-36. In the Commentaries Blackstone presented a similar but ultimately distinguishable view. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, § 3, at 67 ("nothing being more difficult than to
ascertain the precise beginning and first spring of an antient and long established custom").
85 Some truths are too plain to be proved. That a law, which has been established by long and
general custom, must have received its origin and introduction from free and voluntary consent,
is a position that must be evident to every one, who understands the force and meaning of the
terms, in which it is expressed.
1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 184; cf. id. at 337, 356 (the common law contains "the dictates of
nature").
86 Id. at 196; cf N. WOOD, CICERO'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 78-79 (1988).
87 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 91.
88 See generally Conrad, PoliteFoundation,supra note 1; see also, Conrad, Metaphorand Imagination, supra note 1, at 23 & n.81.
89 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 197; cf.id. at 222, 384, 398.
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reached" by any simple scheme of the new science that David Hartley
had been the first to call "psychology" 90 ), Wilson's appeal to the authority of this science of human nature is, throughout his lectures, what unifies his legal theory and "justifies" it as "legal science."
Thus, as varied, complex, and indefinite as Wilson took human nature to be, he contemplated no other sound basis for legitimate human
authority but this most important of all sciences, the science of the mind.
It, more than any other source or method, afforded men the means to
fulfill their duty to "know themselves," both as men and as citizens, and
to "know" their institutions, as well. 9 1 For Wilson, knowing, not merely
thinking or learning, was the object of any true "science"; and knowledge
was the only scientific ground for politics or law. One of Wilson's greatest anxieties about the immediate circumstances of the American republic was that its system of law, depending as it must on the idea of
consensual obligation for its "animating principle, ' 92 would remain in
danger of being corrupted by subtly "despotick" influences like Blackstone's unless this animating principle were secured on the "solid foundation" of knowledge. 93 While Wilson was quick to attest that the
American Revolution itself had been a rich source of new knowledge in
this respect, 94 there was still much yet to be understood and taught.
What the historian James Kettner says about the "ramifications" of
the consent theory of obligation in politics was equally true of its ramifications in legal theory. To Americans of the Revolutionary and Founding decades, the problem as they saw it was that they were among the first
generations of mankind ever to "explore deeply" the actual "character"
of consensual "allegiance" to a free political regime and its law, by exploring the nature of the "relationships between the individual and the
community of which he [is] a part."95 This crucial problem was, to Wilson, one to which law could and must contribute to the answer. For, in
the Montesquieuan conception of law held by Wilson, 96 "law in general"
is not, as Blackstone would have it, "a rule" so much as it is a "relation."' 9 7 According to such a conception of law, the independent significance of law itself is minimized when law is conceived of as inhering in a
90 Id. at 200. For Hartley's use of the term "psychology," see 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 766 (2d ed. 1989); see also F. KENNER, THE CHAIN OF BECOMING 15 (1983).
91 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 157, 197.
92 Id. at 363.
93 Id. at 222-23.

94 Address by James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 362; cf. id. at 348.
95 J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 189 (1978).
96 See P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA, 1760-1801, at 91 (1940) (a contemporary observer said that Montesquieu's works occupied "a position of first importance" in Wilson's library;
he made "a daily study of them").
97 See MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 1 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) ("Laws, in their
most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things.") For Wil-
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relationship or "intimate connection" (as the etymology of the word
"lex" discloses). All legal relationships thus take their meaning, and de-

rive their (human) authority, not from any laws themselves, but from
their social basis. And this social basis is manifested in the idea, life, and
history of "a people," whose "existence" as a "unity" is ultimately "quite
independent of all laws." 98
Hewing to the notion that any and all legal relationships in the
American republic must be consensual in order to be "binding," 99 Wilson therefore approached the problem of devising a general theory of the
common law
in terms of an inquiry into the nature of community, or
1

"society," 00 as he called it, and into individual human nature.101 He
gives no indication of wanting to relax in any way the Lockean constraint

that consent, in order to obligate an individual, must be individual, active

consent.' 0 2 Yet he plainly resisted confining his theory of consent by

reducing it into a definition, or by deriving it from the contractarian scenarios of histoire raisonneJ. Instead, he was resolved to attend scrupu-

lously to whatever "phenomena" might "import" this consent. 10 3
son's rejection of what he takes to be Blackstone's conception of law as "rule," see I WORKS, supra
note 1, at 100-02.
Hooker, I think, conveys a fuller and stronger conception of law, when he tells us, that "it
assigns unto each thing the kind, that it moderates the force and power, that it appoints the
form and measure of working." Not the direction merely, but the kind also, the energy, and the
proportion of actions is suggested in this description.
Id. at 101. But Wilson's position is hardly unambiguous, in that elsewhere he wrote, "Law in particular, which (being intended for universal reception) ought to be a plain rule of action." Id. at 63
(1791 letter proposing to digest the laws of Pennsylvania). Still, I believe the context and circumstances of this occasional remark were such that it does little or nothing to diminish the force of
Wilson's'antipathy to Blackstone's positivism, an antipathy that pervades the Lectures on Law.
98 H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 187-89 (rev. ed. 1963). In my view Arendt gives the best
account we have of this Montesquieuan conception of law in its significance for early American
republican theory. On Wilson's own appreciation of the "Roman" origins of this conception, see 1
WORKS, supra note 1, at 123; cf id. at 102.
Others have expressed similar notions:
The idea ...is that expressed by Cicero, that law is the common possession of a people in its
corporate capacity. This idea appears in the theory that customary law has the consent of the
people, since custom exists only in common practice. It appears also in the clasification of the
sources from which law is derived. Thus law might arise by the enactment of a popular assembly (leges), or by the vote of some authorized part of the people such as a plebian assembly
(plebescita), or by a decree of the Senate (senatus consulta), or by a decree of the Emperor
(constitutiones), or by the edict of an ordinance-issuing official. In all cases, however, the source
must be authorized and in the last resort all forms of law go back to the legal activity inherent in
a politically organized people. In a sense every established organ of government does "represent" the people in some degree and some capacity, but there is obviously no implication that
representation has anything to do with voting and still, less that voting is a right inherent in
every person. The "people" is an entity quite different from the persons who happen at any
given time to be included in it.
G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 172 (1937).
99 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 189.
100 Id. at 227-46, passim.
101 Id. at 197-226.
102 Eg., id. at 243-46.
103 Eg., I WORKS, supra note 1, at 123; see also id. at 180.
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Accordingly, although his approach to a general theory of consensual
obligation is at many points diffuse, it is perhaps in his reconception of
the common law that he comes closest to making his theory clear. He
accomplishes this by conceiving of the common law itself as the exemplary republican social "science"-in the strict, cognate sense: what a
society knows about itself and how it puts that knowledge to use.
From Wilson's perspective, the endeavor to secure and increase the
knowledge a society has of itself called for a phenomenological method of
inquiry, in legal science no less than in the science of man. This is just
the point Wilson makes in undertaking his general discussion of the nature of "society." And he makes this point chiefly by recalling that his
entire approach to legal theory in the law lectures had been predicated on
his general aversion to definitions and fixed distinctions of all kinds. Indeed, he had announced his position at the outset, in rejecting not only
Blackstone's general definition of law, but also the very idea of any general definition of law, especially any analytic, and hence reductive,
definition. 104
On that earlier occasion he had cited Thomas Reid, the doyen of the
Scottish Common Sense school, as one of the "philosophers," together
with Bacon, Bolingbroke, and Kames, whom he takes as guides on his
questions of method. By the time he arrived at his lecture "Of Man, as
an Individual," he had praised Reid above all other philosophers of the
age,'0 5 and had relied heavily on Reidian Common Sense throughout his
discussion of the nature "of man as an individual."
Yet it is only in Wilson's pivotal discussion of human nature considered in the context of "'society" that the full importance of Reid's Common Sense, "scientific" renovation of orthodox eighteenth-century
"moral sense" doctrines becomes clear. For it is here that Wilson rehearses the central polemical argument of Reid and his school: that
those metaphysicians, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who had resolved, or unwittingly tended, to "divide" and "reduce" the human mind
into its individual faculties had thereby obscured a whole category of
"social operations" of the mind that are in fact "deeply laid" in human
nature. It is these "social operations" that, in turn, are the locus of the
indefinite and innumerable, but authentic and authorizing, "connexions"
between the individual and his society.106

Here Wilson is distinguishing the "science" that was later to become
104 Id. at 229; see also id. at 98-101.

On Blackstone's attempt to reconcile his "analytical

method" with the "common law content" of the Commentaries, see Lobban, supra note 74, at 32335.
105 See I WORKS, supra note 1, at 213-26 (Wilson's historical sketch of the opinions of philosophers, beginning with Plato); see also id. at 193-94. Wilson also cited Reid prominently in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-54 (1793). Cf generally Howe, The Political
Psychology of The Federalist, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 485 (1987).
106 1 WORKS, supra note I, at 230-32.
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known as "social psychology." He considered it a science that had only
quite recently been rediscovered and elucidated, principally by none
other than Reid. But, Wilson added of late, "both on this and on the
other side of the Atlantick... the spirit of patriotism has been vigorously
exerted" 10 7 to promote this pioneering inquiry into the "social operations" of the mind and their significance in politics and law.
This is not the place to follow Wilson's expatiations on his Common
Sense conception of these distinctive and irreducible "social operations"
of the mind. For the purpose at hand-that is, to recognize the importance of the "naive realism" propounded by Reidian Common Sense to
Wilson's conception of the common law-it may suffice to quote one of
Wilson's general, descriptive, and comparative statements of what he
means when he refers to these "social operations":
Some operations of the mind may take place in a solitary state: others,
from their very nature, are social; and necessarily suppose a communication
with some other intelligent being. In a state of absolute solitude, one may
apprehend, and judge, and reason. But when he bears or hears testimony;
when he gives or receives a command; when he enters into an engagement
by a promise or a contract; these acts imply necessarily something more
than apprehension, judgment, and reasoning; they imply necessarily a society with other beings, social as well as intelligent.108
For Wilson, then, it is these "connexions" with society, which are
"deeply laid" in every individual of ordinary "constitution," that make it
possible for citizens to obligate themselves consensually, under government and law. Moreover, it is in these "connexions" that consent implicates not only an individual's will but also his knowledge.
It is, however, not to a historic or a mythic "social contract" that
Wilson recurs in explaining the necessity of both will and knowledge for
consensual obligation. Rather, it is to the most pervasive of the generic
"forms" at common law that he turns: the legal contract. Through "private contract" a man can consensually obligate himself;10 9 but, when it
comes to the fundamental matter of obligation through consent, Wilson
is ultimately concerned not with "forms," but with "principles." ' 110 And
the essential principle of authentic obligation was thoroughly familiar to
the classical law of contracts in just the formulation that Wilson gives:
For obligation to be consensual, it must be both "voluntary" and
"knowing.""'
Wilson's focus on will and knowledge as the constituent elements of
consent was thus squarely within the common-law tradition; yet he sustained this focus from the novel perspective of the "new science" of social
107 Id. at 229.

108
109
110
111

Id. at 230.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 180; see also supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 190.
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psychology. From this perspective, the mental phenomena of the "sociable self," together with the processes of individual socialization, seemed
to become the most important objects of inquiry into the nature of a
republican institution.
Merely to adopt this perspective, however, even on the good authority of the Common Sense "science of man," did not satisfy the need Wilson saw for a "comprehensive" and operational theory of consensual
obligation. Rather, it approached the challenge of devising a theory by
translating the problem presented into different terms. As Professor
Pocock has remarked in commenting on this enterprise of translation in
early American republican theory, "[t]here was a point at which the
proposition that the self was sociable raised [rather than settled] funda'1 12
mental questions about the relation of self to society."
For Wilson, what this proposition does occasion, however, is a commitment not just to the Lockean doctrine of the primacy of "society"
above any institution of law or government, but also to the resolutely
sociological orientation of Montesquieu's masterpiece of scientific constitutionalism, The Spirit of the Laws.' 13 Additionally, it entailed what by
1790 had become for Burke the dogma from which his own case for a
modem revision of "the common-law mind" proceeded: that "[m]anners
are of more importance than laws[, because manners] aid morals, they
supply them, or they totally destroy them."'1 14 Indeed, Wilson thought
the matter so well settled that he need do no more to make Monstesquieu's and Burke's point than pose the rhetorical question, "What are
laws without manners?" 1 5
But if manners, in the sense of mores, were to Wilson more fundamental than law, and if social science was then the source of authorization for "legal science," this did not mean to Wilson, as it had meant to
Montesquieu, that republican theory is hostage to historical pessimism.1 16 Even less did it mean to Wilson, as it meant to Burke, that
prescriptive authority and institutionalized aristocracy are necessary constituents of a constitutionalism of the common-law mind for the modem
112 Pocock, Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana, 48 J.
HisT. IDEAS 325, 340 (1987); see also Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: 4 Modelfor Historians
of PoliticalThought, in J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 37
[hereinafter Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners].
113 Montesquieu stated that throughout his study he had by design
not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pretend to treat of the laws, but
their "spirit," and as the spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to

different objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of the laws as that of
their relations and objects.
C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 97, at 7.
114 E. BURKE, LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE (quoted in Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Man-

ners, supra note 112, at 49); cf. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 382.
115 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 85.
116 Cf. J. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 49-66 (1987); P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA, 17601801, at 225-26 (1940).
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era. Wilson considered that republicanism in America had by 1790 already transcended the historicism that darkened Montesquieu's vision,
just as surely as Americans had decisively rejected the aristocratic ethos
117
of Burke's.
IV.

THE "ORIGINAL POWERS" OF "CIVIL SOCIETY" AS AUTHORITY
FOR THE COMMON LAW

The concern over the distinction between "power" and "authority"
that is so familiar to modem liberal theory was no less a concern in Wilson's liberal republicanism. His law lectures alone are compelling evidence that the American Founding was not what Hannah Arendt once
characterized it as having been: an event which, in the minds of the
Founders, "authorized itself."""8 The importance of knowledge (at least
to some Federalists) in the requisite task of conceiving of authorization
beyond the "act of foundation," and even beyond the "power" of "the
People," 1 19 is clear enough in John Adams' otherwise strikingly ambiguous remark in 1785 that, "[t]he social science will never be much improved, until the people unanimously know and consider themselves as
the fountain of power ....
In this remark, for all its emphasis on what "the people" must come
to "know," there is, however, an apparent final emphasis on power itself.
Wilson sometimes expressed himself similarly; on at least one occasion at
21
the Federal Convention he referred to "the original powers of Society"'
in a context suggesting that, while he deemed these powers to be insufficient to fulfill his constitutionalist vision for America, he acknowledged
that the fundamental and decisive authority of a society, in law and government, was justified by its powers.122 Evidently it was not troubling to
Wilson that, in this matter, authority derived from power.
If there is a paradox here in the apparent inversion of "power" and
"authority" in a considered statement by so liberal a republican as Wilson, the paradox is easily explained by recalling that the "power" of
which Wilson spoke was the power of "knowledge" itself. To Wilson no
other power but the "scientific" power of knowledge could legitimately
117 See 2 WORKS, supra note 1, at 574.
118 H. ARENDT, supra note 98, at 202-04.

119 See id. at 182.
120 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 540 (C. Adams ed. 1854).
121 2 FARRAND, supranote 58, at 469 (Madison's notes of Aug. 30, 1787). Compare this formulation with the more conventional formulation of the "authority" of society in terms of the peoplefor example, the "authority ... of the people at large." 1 FARRAND, supra note 58, at 132-33
(Madison's notes of June 6, 1787).
122 Wilson quoted Hooker for a comparable proposition: "The lawful power of making laws to
command whole politick societies of men, belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies." 1
WORKS, supra note I, at 123. By contrast, Wilson held a very different earlier position, at least as it
has been interpreted by Dennison. See Dennison, supra note 1, at 172.
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be invoked to create authority. At the early point in the development of
American constitutionalism at which Wilson found himself, the orthodox liberal sequence of derivation (deriving power from authority) was,
in a sense, impossible-at least for the authorization of the new popular
republican government-since the new national government and the several state regimes were at the time patently still so much in the
123
making.
As Professor Dennison puts the matter in discussing Wilson's attempt to incorporate "the revolution principle" of consensual obligation
into a theory of a stabilizing constitutionalism, Wilson's conception of
consensual obligation required him to "postulate[ ] an American society
before one existed." 124 For, in fact, "one would have to be created from
125
whole cloth, a process requiring time to complete."
While postulating American society as an established institution-in
order to "invent a People," as Professor Judith Shklar has phrased the
matter 126 -Wilson, one of the consummate Federalist apologists, also
put great faith in the social consequences of establishing extensive political representation as a civic (and civil) institution. Indeed, among all
the leading Federalists, he was one of the strongest and most unrelenting
advocates of extended political representation to (what then seemed) the
utmost-by means of a broad suffrage, the minimization of formal qualifications for elected office, and a uniform practice of direct popular elections. 12 7 This "extension" of political representation was so important to
Wilson that he dared say that by 1790 the American republic, although it
still fell short of his ideal in this respect, nevertheless afforded the very
first instance in history of government according to a plan of "comprehensive" political representation. 128 Even the contemporary British constitution, though in many respects not to be despised, nonetheless fell so
short of providing sufficiently extensive representation that it too
presented yet another lamentable example of a "government" not really
29
based on the foundation of what could be called a true "People" at all.1
Wilson thought that in America, however, the unprecedented extension
of political representation had created (or was in the process of creating)
123

See E.

ELLIOTT, REVOLUTIONARY WRITERS: LITERATURE AND AUTHORITY IN THE NEW

REPUBLIC, 1725-1810, at 19-53 (1982).
124 Dennison, supra note 1, at 190.
125 Id.; see also Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma ofAmerican NationalIdentity, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION:

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDEN-

333 (1987); Zuckerman, Identity in British America: Unease in Eden, in COLONIAL IDENTITY
IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1500-1800, at 115 (1987).
126 J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 71-72 (1984); see also E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:
THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
127 The most convenient collection of documentary evidence for this point is in G. SEED, supra
note 1, at 42-69, 122-40.
128 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 60, at 354.
129 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 462 (1793).
TITY
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"a People" in the fullest sense, in large part by inculcating civic practices
and routines of civility, inspired by and attendant upon the right of suffrage, that would harness resources of both popular will and popular
130
knowledge in the service of the Republic.
To recall these features of Wilson's constitutional theory is to be
reminded of the frequent reference that Americans in Wilson's day made
to "the publick mind." And Wilson himself made clear that for him this
"publick mind" was not merely a synonym for "public opinion"-a term
then only beginning its rise to importance in politics and political science."1 31 Rather, in Wilson's Common Sense view, "the publick mind"
encompassed "knowledge" as much as "opinion," and "understanding"
as much as "will." Indeed, as I have emphasized elsewhere, 132 Wilson
believed that perhaps the most important lesson he had learned from
Thomas Reid about human nature was that,
It is probable, that there is no operation of the understanding, in which...
the will has not some share. On the other hand, there can be no energy of
the will, which is not accompanied with some act of the understanding. In
the operations of the mind, both faculties generally, if not always concur
133

It is thus important to recognize that, while yielding to no one in his
firmly held view that extensive political representation was essential for
republican institutionalization of the public mind, Wilson also thought
the common law in America to be an important institutional analog of
this complex "publick mind," comprehending as it did both knowledge
justified by experience and opinion evincing the energy of will. In this
respect, the common law was therefore an indispensable complement of
electoral representation as a democratic political institution. Indeed,
given the novel and still problematic circumstances of extensive political
representation that Wilson himself had observed in America,13 4 he considered the common law to be not just a necessary complement of, but
also a necessary supplement to political representation, 135 since electoral
politics and the common law each equally embodied, in principle, the
means and ends of republican government.
This avowedly "fundamental" significance of the common law to
Wilson is a matter somewhat neglected by historians of political
130 See I WORKS, supra note 1, at 404-05: 2 WORKS, supra note 1, at 787-88; see also Conrad,
Polite Foundation,supra note 1, at 381-85; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward:
Traces ofSelf-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 54 (1986).
131 For an elegant discussion that relates this "rise" in America to the Baconian tradition, among
others, see Beer, Two Models ofPublic Opinion: Bacon's "New Logic" andDiotima's "Tale ofLove"
2 POL. THEORY 163 (1974).
132 Conrad, Polite Foundation,supra note 1, at 382.
133 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 199.

134 See, e.g., id. at 158; 2 WORKS, supra note 1, at 786.
135 Cf Goldstein, PopularSovereignty, the Origins of JudicialReview, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POLtcs 51, 63-67 (1986).
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thought-even in the invaluable treatments by Professors Wood and
Dennison, for example 136 -if only because it falls largely outside the chosen scope of their work. But, as I have meant to suggest, to neglect Wilson's legal theory is to neglect an intrinsic part of his political theory, not
to mention his constitutional theory.
It is especially interesting, then, to remember that Wilson's conception of the common law as complement of, if not supplement to, his theories of republican politics and constitutional jurisprudence did catch the
eye of Charles Beard. In An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution
of the United States, Beard noted how important law in general was to
Wilson's idea of American politics. But, in keeping with the argument of
that brilliant and tendentious book, Beard asserted that Wilson looked to
law not as an implementation or augmentation of popular politics, but as
a crucial restraint on it, in that Wilson looked to the judiciary to "control" and "check" the power of the people as it is realized in "popular
137
legislation."
Where Beard errs-in reminding us that for Wilson politics and law,
although distinguishable, were of a piece 13 8 -is in Beard's failure to appreciate the considerable importance of law to Wilson not just as an arm
139
of strictly voluntarist, instrumental politics, but as a "social science"
in its own right. And yet, even Professor Dennison, in doing so much to
set right the Beardian view of Wilson in this respect, still does not go far
enough. For in showing how Wilson's general understanding of the
Revolution and the Founding was derived from his vision of American
society, Dennison presents such a generalized account of Wilson's conception of "society" that he slights the distinction that gave Wilson's vision much of its distinctiveness and coherence, and its significance for
politics and law. This is the distinction Wilson made between "natural
society" and "civil society."
For example, in developing this distinction in a way quite different
from Locke's way, 14° Wilson introduced into his legal theory what was
not primarily a formal distinction at all-although, as I have said, Wilson often took "forms" to be illustrative of the principles he meant to
establish.141 Rather, it was ultimately a moral distinction that for him
marked the "real" and important differences between natural society and
civil society, as he cumulatively described without presuming to define
the latter. This was a distinction that posited a fund of civic morality in
136 See G. WOOD, supra note 41, at 259-305; Dennison, supra note 1; cf F. McDONALD, supra
note 13, at 9-55.
137 See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 216 (reprint ed. 1986).
138 E.g., I WORKS, supra note 1, at 356-57.
139 Cf.Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners,supra note 112, at 49 ("Jurisprudence, whatever it
was like as the formal study of law, was the social science of the eighteenth century.").
140 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 238, passim.
141 Cf.id. at 239, 361 (civil society formed by an original compact).
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a "civil society," or "People," or "state"-all terms Wilson used as synonyms for one another14 2 -that accrues from the self-conscious knowledge Wilson followed eighteenth-century British convention in calling
"moral science."
In his attempt to develop a "comprehensive view" of the Federalist
project of "inventing a People," Wilson thus anticipated a central problem Shklar ascribes to modem "liberal democracy" in general: that
"[w]ithout ancestor worship or divine providence to rely on" for authorization, "modem liberal democracy has little but its moral promise to
sustain it."143 It is this consideration, she says, that has helped to make
such an important, indeed necessary, place in American politics for "hypocrisy" (or delusion).
In a way, Wilson anticipated this last insight, too-at least insofar as
he drew so assiduously, uncritically, and anxiously on Scottish Common
Sense as a philosophy offering at once culturally fashionable and "scientifically" fortified reassurances that men's belief in their moral capabilities is "justified." The wholesale moral reaffirmation that Common
Sense proclaimed, and the aspirations to social reform as moral reform
that it inculcated, were thus what recommended it so warmly to George
III, Dr. Johnson, and James Wilson alike. 144 In the milieu of Atlantic
high culture that the Revolution never seriously disrupted, Scottish
Common Sense effectively sustained the Augustan belief that, as Wilson
put it, "progress in virtue" and "progress in knowledge" bear a "just
proportion" to one another. 145 In other words, Common Sense empiriwhat Wilson, in his lectures and elsewhere, called
cally vindicated
14 6

"politeness."

The "polite" principles that Wilson found in Common Sense, and
the "polite" character (or capability) that he claimed he saw in American
society, convinced him that American society had already acquired and
was cultivating the resources of "civility" that he took to be a condition
of the feasibility of liberal representative democracy. The politeness of
the American citizenry was not for him an end in itself: "politeness" and
"civility," he knew full well, could co-exist with, and even serve the purposes of, despotic regimes. 14 7 Yet Wilson averred that in a constitutional
republic like America, where the republican manners of the People universally testified to a zealous "love of liberty," "politeness," or "civility,"
142 See, eg., id. at 239, 270, 401; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 418, 455 (1793); see also
Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination, supra note 1, at 26-31.
143 J.SHKLAR, supra note 126, at 70.
144 On George III and Dr. Johnson in this respect, see S. CONRAD, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMON
SENSE: THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF
THE WISE CLUB OF ABERDEEN 186, passim (1987).

145 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 147.
146 See Conrad, Polite Foundation,supra note 1, at 374-88; Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination,
supra note 1, at 17-19.
147 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 343.
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afforded values and processes of republican socialization without which
representative democracy could not long endure.148
It bears repeated emphasis that the politeness that for Wilson characterized a "civil society" was a matter of "knowledge" as well as "will,"
in precisely the same sense of those terms that Wilson meant when he
characterized the consensual authority of the common law as derived
from both knowledge and will. Perhaps this is why the best restatement
we have of Wilson's general theory of a common law for America is not
that of any modem student of the history of political, legal, or constitutional thought, strictly speaking, but that by the historians of philosophy
Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey. They tell us that to Wilson
the common law was the exemplary "species" of human law because it
was "designed and created in accordance with custom" in such a way
that "it express[ed] funded social wisdom." 149
Even this formulation, however, does not indicate quite clearly
enough how faithfully Wilson's approach to reconceptualizing the common law exemplifies what Gladys Bryson once called "the comparable
15 0
interests of the old moral philosophy and the modem social sciences."
In the case of the liberal Scottish sociology on which Wilson drew so
heavily, these comparable interests centered on a vision of integrating
knowledge and morals, facts and values, truth and belief, and other such
arch-dualisms-through formulas of reconceptualization that would, in
practice, as Wilson virtually confessed, avoid the immediate problem of
confronting contradictions.1 5 1 And the occasion of this telling remark by
148 Recalling attention to this point was one of my principal aims in Polite Foundation. Yet, in
repeating it here, I cannot help but remark self-critically that nothing in that essay, or in this, explains the apparently paradoxical relationship between Wilson's "polite" orientation and the political vicissitudes he experienced that would seem to have made such an orientation difficult for him to
sustain. After all, it was none other than Wilson who became the eponymous victim of one of the
most noted episodes of mob violence in early American politics. See Alexander, The Fort Wilson
Incident of 1779: A Case Study of the Revolutionary Crowd, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 589 (1974); Maier,
Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 35
(1970); Rosswurm, "As a Lyen out of His Den'" Philadelphia'sPopularMovement, 1776-80, in THE
ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RADICALISM 300, 313-15 (1984).
149 1 E. FLOWER & M. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 332 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Goldstein, supra note 135, at 68. Wilson, in Of the Common Law, wrote: "Indeed, what we call human reason, in general, is not so much the knowledge, or experience, or
information of any one man, as the knowledge, and experience, and information of many, arising
from lights mutually and successively communicated and improved." 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at
358.
150 Bryson, The ComparableInterests of the Old Moral Philosophy and the Modern Social Sciences, 11 Soc. FORCES 19 (1932).
151 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 185; cf C. GEERTZ, Common Sense as a CulturalSystem, in
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 73, 93 (1983) (quot-

ing an early 18th-century definition of "common sense": "the ordinary ability to keep ourselves
from being imposed upon by gross contradictions, palpable inconsistencies, and unmask'd
impostures").
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Wilson was none other than one on which he undertook to cope with
Blackstone.
For if Wilson revealed nothing so much as his repressed anxiety
about the American Founding when he castigated Blackstone as an apologist for "despotism," nevertheless, he was quite correct in discerning
that the ambivalent common-law mind that Blackstone embodied did not
call for the thoroughgoing synthesis of "law and liberty," "experience
and opinion," and, above all, "knowledge and will" that Wilson insisted
was necessary for a truly republican common law. To Blackstone, the
"consensual" authority of "customary" common law had little or nothing to do with knowledge. That is what Wilson, protesting both on behalf of American republicanism and the authentic common-law
tradition, could not abide. As I have tried to point out, this is where the
Common Sense rehabilitation of "politeness" and "civility" served him,
in reconceiving what the common law meant.
V. CONCLUSION

While the express references to "the common law" in The Federalist
are remarkably few and brief, they are no less significant for that. 152
Moreover, I have in mind for my immediate purposes only those instances in which the reference is not merely to an individual doctrine,
rule, or other element of the common law, but to the common'law as a
tradition, to "the common-law mind."
Even Madison's passing reference in The Federalist No. 37 to "the
common law"-as but one more example supporting the general argument that pervades this one of the The Federalistpapers-is important,
because of the underlying importance to Madison of his general argument, and because of what it suggests about why he, in contrast to Wilson, evidently never felt a need to offer a general, "republicanized"
theory of "the Common Law." The reference in question occurs in what
must now seem to have been the obviously true assertion that
the precise extent of the common law, the statute law, the maritime law, the
ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations and other local laws and customs,
remain[s] still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where
accuracy in such subjects153has been more industriously pursued than in any
other part of the world.
Although there is nothing in this statement that Wilson would have
disputed, how different in emphasis and tone Madison's statement is
from the remarks Wilson was shortly to offer in his law lectures about
the uninterrupted pre-eminence of "the Common Law" in English legal
culture. Wilson was certain of this, or professed to be, notwithstanding
152 See T. ENGEMAN, E. ERLER & T. HOFELLER, THE FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE 85, 293

(1988).
153 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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the gaps and vagueness he acknowledged in the extant historical record;
for though Wilson made use of that record, he believed he had-and had
to have-other ways of knowing he was right. But Madison, the prudent
skeptic, saw an open question where Wilson held firmly to a histoicmore, a necessary-truth. Madison's general argument ultimately becomes an argument about the limits of men's capacity to arrive at certainty, knowledge, or even consensus on almost any matter of practical
moment, great or small. In fact, in the context of The Federalistpapers
in general, Federalist No. 37 can be read as something of a "skeptical
digression" 154 amounting to "a short essay concerning the human
15 5
understanding."
Madison's paper No. 37 is therefore hardly an irrelevant or insignificant digression, if it is a digression at all. It is perhaps his most elegant
and revealing statement of the theory of knowledge that informed his
constitutional theory. We might even wish that Madison had told us
more, that he had revealed at greater length, if not more self-consciously,
his epistemology and his own view of the relationship between it and his
constitutional thought.
Because Madison never tells us much more in this regard than we
56
find in FederalistNo. 37, it has been left to scholars like Morton White
to venture analysis, arguments, deductions, and inferences about the relationship between Madison's theory of knowledge and Madison's constitutional theory that are, of necessity, somewhat speculative. 157 In any
case, it is important to appreciate that such speculation, however problematic, is in principle eminently worth the candle if only in that, as Professor Appleby has recently observed, "recognizing how our culture of
constitutionalism implicates theories of knowledge should ... help us
appreciate the limits of historical evidence." 1 5 8
For even if what I take to be the prudent skepticism of Madison's
epistemology was and remains a theory of knowledge "implicated in our
constitutional culture," there can be little doubt that the "naive realism"
of Wilson's Common Sense theory of knowledge has not retained the
appeal and authority it had for him and a number of his contemporaries. 159 And without its "scientific" authorization in Common Sense, Wil154 D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF The Federalist 117 (1984).

155 Id. at 114.
156 M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).

157 See G. White, Book Review, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 499 (1987); see also McCoy, Book Review, 8 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 80 (1988).

158 Letter from Joyce Appleby, in PERSPECTIVES: AM. HIsT. A. NEWSL., Mar. 1987, at 15; see
also Appleby, One Good Turn Deserves Another: Moving Beyond the Linguistic Turn; A Response to
David Harlan 94 AM. HIST. REV. 1326 (1989).
159 For a general introduction to the heyday of Common Sense in America, the most accessible
published works are H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); D. MEYER, THE DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT (1976); D.

MEYER, THE INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE:

THE AMERICAN NATIONAL ETHIC (1972).
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son's general "republican" theory of the common law and common-law
constitutionalism is left without the foundation that he himself said it
required.
To say this much is simply to make a point as familiar in the work
of Professor Pocock 160 as it is in that of many other historians, 61 and not
least some Critical legal historians.1 62 When we take into account the
historical context and historical contingency of any statement of an idea
that has pretensions to theoretical (that is, explanatory, or "justifying")
force, then we are likely to find that the statement takes so much of its
meaning from the way it functions in its original ideological context that
we must question whether, once the context changes, we should or even
can recover that meaning for the purpose of making use of it today.163
For example, to turn to one of Hamilton's contributions to The Federalistpapers, we find in FederalistNo. 84 Hamilton's famous argument
against amending the proposed Constitution by adding a bill of rights.
Hamilton argues that, notwithstanding the legendary constitutional significance of such historic "declarations of right" in England, foremostly
those of 1215, 1612, and 1688-89:
[It] is evident.., that according to their primitive signification, they have
no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the
people, and executed by their immediate servants and representatives.
Here, [in the American case], in strictness, the people surrender nothing,
and as they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations.... [In the opening sentence of the preamble of the proposed Constitution] is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those
aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of
rights .... 164
This was an argument with which Wilson too had prominently identified
himself.1 6 5 And it was, in effect, an argument that made use of the comAmerica, 1768-1850: An Evaluation of Its Influence (1963) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
American University). On the authority of Common Sense today, at least among philosophers, the
best short introduction known to me is Lehrer, Reid's Influence on ContemporaryAmerican and
British Philosophy, in THOMAS REID: CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS 1 (1976); see also Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination, supra note 1, at 22 n.76, passim. Nevertheless, for philosophers, historians,
and others, one of the most stimulating discussions of the meaning and authority of Common Sense
today is surely C. GEERTZ , supra note 151. For calling my attention to this essay I thank my everresourceful friend John Patterson.
160 See J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1-34.
161 E.g., J. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 75.

162 E.g., Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1051-54 & n.143 (1981)
(citing work by Tushnet, Kennedy, and Klare).
163 For an argument quite to the contrary, see Presser, Saving God's Republic" The Jurisprudence
of Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 771.
164 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578-80 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton's discussion in The Federalist No. 83 of the common-law right to trial by jury, including discussion of
certain proposals mooted in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, is interesting in this context. THE
FEDERALIST No. 83, at 565-74 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
165 See Wilson's State House Speech, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 167-72.
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mon-law tradition against itself. It characterized the signal historical
moments of the tradition-the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, and
the English Bill of Rights-as redundant "declarations" that did nothing
to secure, much less to enhance, common-law rights and, instead, posed
the danger of diminishing them: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
That two such strong nationalists as Hamilton and Wilson could
and did make this argument plausibly if not persuasively suggests, again,
not only how deep the ambiguities of the common-law tradition ran but
also how useful those ambiguities could be as the ideological context
changed over time. 166 From the outset, the "common-law mind" had
displayed an ambivalence about the territorial scope of "custom" as a
source of law. To Sir John Davies, as Professor Pocock quotes him,
"custom" in this sense plainly was not local, or even national (e.g., Irish),
but was rather "the common custom of the realm." 1 67 And yet, as Professor Greene reminds us, a "fierce, full-hearted localism" did have a
very important place in the common-law tradition, both in England and
America, and showed little sign of diminution in the eighteenth century,
even in the new American republic when the fortunes of the Federalists'
nationalism were at their highest.1 68 As "customary" law, the common
law was, then, by necessity neither predominantly "local" nor predominantly national (or, for that matter, imperial) as to its territorial ambit.
But nationalists like Hamilton and Wilson had their preferences as
between the predominance of the one orientation and the predominance
of the other. In Wilson's bounded universalization of the very idea of
what an American "Common Law" was and had to be-a historic inheritance justified by a social science that "escapes from history,"' 69 but that
depends on the existence of a "civil society" which in its manners is
"thoroughly republican"- one cannot but infer that Wilson was pursuing his nationalist aims, albeit by indirection.
As many common lawyers would be likely to acknowledge, I suspect, argument by indirection is one of the principal methods of common-law jurisprudence. The adaptation, or manipulation, of the
166 For the use to which Hamilton puts the historic ambiguities of the common-law tradition
concerning the scope of appellate jurisdiction, see THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961). Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 164, at 570-71 (on "common law jurisdiction").
See generally Stoner, Constitutionalismand Judging in The Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 203-18, 310-13 (C. Kesler ed.
1987). "Publius seems more explicitly bent on quieting republican jealousy and rallying the partisans of good government than on cultivating a general judiciousness, and.., his ambiguity on the
judicial power suggests the limits either of his attention or his theory." Id. at 217.
167 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 266.
168 J.P. GREENE, supra note 19, at 11.
169 J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 95; see also J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 545-46 (1975); S. Conrad, James Wilson's Vision of the "Escape from

History" (manuscript in the possession of the author).
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authority of "custom" virtually requires indirection-or else the illusion

of continuity is lost, and with it the "tradition." But some of our leading
neo-whig historians have lately invited us to consider a proposition that
most modem common lawyers might not be so quick to concede (and

that at least one of these historians, Professor Reid, emphatically refuses
to concede 170 ): that the common-law tradition, "the common-law
mind," has always been so ambivalent in itself that, as in Wilson's "polite" Common Sense polemic against Blackstone, in any "comprehen-

sive" theory of the common law, the fixed point of authorization may
well necessarily lie outside legal institutions and strictly legal culture
altogether.171
The common law is, as Wilson said in following Coke, a "social

system" of law, in that it happily borrows from other systems of law as

needed. 172 But, when it comes to the underlying matter of authorization,
"the common-law mind" and its tradition are intrinsically more susceptible to than capable of assimilation. This is what makes it so important, in
any specific ideological context, to ask how and into what the mentality
and the tradition are assimilated. 173 The answers to these questions are

likely to reveal every theory of the common law to be a "political" theory
and tell us as much as anything can about the "success" it is likely to

enjoy or not.

170 See, eg., J. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 188; J. REID, AUTHORITY TO
TAX, supra note 13, at 265, 268.
171 Cf J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986). I take it that
there is no such concession, express or implied, in the conclusion reached in M. EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988)

[Under the institutional principles that govern the way in which the common law is established
in our society, there is a necessary connection between the content of the common law and those
moral norms, policies, and experiential propositions that play a role in the standards of social
congruence and systematic consistency, because those standards figure in determining both
what the common law should be and what it is. Because of the dual role those standards play,
what the common law is cannot be determined without consideration of what the common law
should be.
Id. at 161. For me to hazard the notion set forth in the text is not to deny in the least that the
common law and its tradition have proved to have instrumental capabilities of great historic, and
even enduring, significance. Thus, I would no more deny Professor Bailyn's point that the American
revolutionaries were powerfully influenced by and made effective use of the tradition in their libertarian cause, see B. BAILYN, supra note 14, at 30-31, 76-79, than I would deny John Stuart Mill's
observation, on economic relations in mid-nineteenth-century England, that "[c]ustom is the most
powerful protector of the weak against the strong." J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
243 (W. Ashely ed. 1926) (7th ed. 1871). Nor do I question Professor Tribe's repeated insistence on
"the importance" in contemporary American constitutional jurisprudence "of property and contract
in protecting the dispossessed no less than the established." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1374 (2d ed. 1988); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 949 (1st ed. 1978).
172 1 WORKS, supra note 1, at 357.
173 For a related point, see Shapiro, supra note 66, at 762 ("Perhaps the safest moral for a historian to draw is that legal history should now be more fully pledged to the fraternity of intellectual
history.").

